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ABSTRACT 
The foundation of readiness is training. The Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Joint Training Program 
institutes methods for identitying training requirements 
through review of the Commander-in-Chiefs (CJNC) 
missions and the compilation of Joint Mission Essential 
Task Lists. The Universal Joint Task List comprehen- 
sively outlines these joint essential tasks, providing a 
summary of CJNC missions, joint tasks, and corre- 
sponding supporting and enabling tasks. Computer 
aided exercises (CAXs) are tools available for 
monitoring and training a staff in these tasks. CAXs are 
an essential part of staff training, although one of their 
major weaknesses is their inability to accurately 
measure the level of training received by the players. 
This paper develops au exercise analysis methodology 
for evaluating critical event causal audit trails. Specific 
objectives are to determine quantifiable measures of 
effectiveness designed to work with data manipulated by 
computer simulations and to test MOES using the Joint 
Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). This includes the 
development of post-exercise analysis techniques for 
wargame data. This paper provides a methodology for 
extracting appropriate data from a CAX to develop 
causal audit trails for critical events. The results of a 
CAX will then be more available for trend analysis and 
feedback. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In peacetime, military professionals must acquire the 
skills and develop the confidence and initiative 
necessary to conduct joint and combined operations. 
While professional schools are fundamentally impor- 
tant, the military is a hands-on profession and most 
learning at all levels is accomplished while partici- 
pating in unit training and operations. Hence, realistic, 
demanding and objectively measured training and 
exe~~ises are essential. The Joint Training Program 
defined within the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) Memorandum of Policy 26 (MOP 26) estab- 
lishes a program for carrying out the joint training 
responsibilities of the CJCS, the Joint Commanders-in- 
Chief (CINCs), and the CJNCs’ component staffs. MOP 
26 institutes a method for identifying training require- 
ments through the review of the CJNC’s mission and 
the compilation of essential tasks required to accom- 
plish that mission. Each compiled task list is called the 
ClNC’s Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). 
A CJNC’s JMETL is intended to provide the basis 
for all joint training. A JMETL consists of those tasks 
deemed essential for accomplishment of operational 
plans, predicated on the missions assigned and forces 
apportioned to the CINC, U.S. alliances or treaties, or 
regional initiatives. A JMETL includes Joint Mission 
Essential Tasks, supporting tasks considered essential 
for accomplishment of the Joint Mission Essential 
Tasks, and enabling tasks. 
The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), a 
supplement to the Joint Training Manual (MCM 71- 
92). outlines a comprehensive list of joint essential tasks 
(JCS, 1996) and provides: 
l A summary listing of CJNC Missions. 
l A list of Joint Tasks, the corresponding Support- 
ing Tasks, and their Enabling Tasks. 
l A detailed dictionary of the Joint Tasks, Support- 
ing Tasks, and the Enabling Tasks, describing 
each task in detail. 
For consistency and comparability purposes, each 
ClNC is required to develop a JMETL based on the 
missions and essential tasks outlined in the Universal 
Joint Task List document. The ClNCs are responsible 
for identifying their major missions from the summary 
listing: mapping the major missions to the joint task, 
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determining the joint tasks which are most crucial to 
their missions and which occur most frequently; and 
identifying which tasks are in the greatest need of 
training. 
How doea a CINC go about identifying which tasks 
ani2 “‘in the greate4 need of training?” In addition to 
subjective post-exercise commentary, a complementary, 
objective MOE is needed to quantitatively evaluate staff 
peaformance in all potential Joint Mission Essential 
Tasks, but how is this efficiently done? One of the 
primary training tools available to a CJNC for training 
andevahratinghisstaffinthisregardisanexercise 
supported by a computer simulation model. This is 
commonly referred to as a Computer Aided Exercise 
(CAX). The primary role of the computer simulation is 
to present a decision enviroment within which the 
exercised staff can be presented with realistic situations. 
Although CAXs have proved to be an essential 
training tool for a CINC and his staff, until recently 
there have been few methodologies available to 
quantitatively evaluate the results of the CAX. The 
research efforts of Combs (1995). Towery (1993, 
Brown (1996), Mustin (1996). Cwick (1996), Sullivan 
(1996). Thurman (1996). and Gordon (1996) developed 
individual methodologies and measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs) to quantify and evaluate the performance of a 
CINC’s staff in separate and distinct mission areas. 
These theses covered the topics of logistics support 
intelligence functions, operational maneuver, carrier 
battlegroup anti-air warfare, amphibious logistics, 
mobilization planning, force protection, and operational 
fmpower, respectively. Given these tools, a CINC can 
begin to identify reasons why an exercise produced a 
given outcome in a given mission area. These 
methodologies assist in locating critical events in a 
scenario that signiticantly contribute to its outcome. 
After this analysis, there still exists the problem of 
formulating comprehensive MOEs to evaluate the staffs 
overall performance in all mission areas. 
Simply stated, the problem is that currently there is 
no comprehensive tool for a ClNC to look at an overall 
CAX and its results, accurately pinpoint critical events 
in any or all mission areas, and then determine why 
these critical events occurred. This paper develops a 
methodology and presents results from the Joint Theater 
Level Simulation (JTLS). 
2 MJZTHODOLOGY 
Critical events are those events of a catastrophic nature 
that singularly or in concert with a limited number of 
like events could cause operational and/or strategic level 
consequences. Some examples of events of this nature 
might be the loss of a tank battalion, the destruction of a 
forward deployed ground unit or the completion of a 
successful recoMaissance mission. 
Given the stochastic nature of a CAX, it is possible 
for critical events to occur at any point in the scenario. 
Because a CAX is a training tool fa: the ClNC, the 
question of why the critical event occurred is of great 
importance. The vehicle for ascertaining the answer is 
the audit trail. Audit trails are created by careful 
examination and manipulation of the simulation’s post- 
processor output. The goat is to use the output to trace 
backward from the occurrence of a critical event in an 
attempt to discover the causal relationships. 
Currently, the only capabilities investigators have 
in developing the audit trail are quantitative items such 
as the exact time, place and strength of a unit where the 
critical event occurred If all logically required assets 
are present and functioning at the time of the critical 
event, then it might be said-that the event occurred due 
to the stochastic nature of the model. This is the realism 
imparted by stochastic models. For example, a Patriot 
defense system may be on station; however, scuds may 
still penetrate the air defense envelope. Any enemy 
threat, even though planned for, still has a positive 
probability of defeating the planned defense, regardless 
of the level of preparation. This type of critical event is 
well explained through audit trail analysis. The 
situation gets more difficult to evaluate when pieces 
seem to be missing from the puzzle. If, for instance, a 
major supply depot is destroyed by undetected enemy air 
forces and it is subsequently discovered, via the audit 
trail, that the depot was virtually unprotected, the CJNC 
will want to know why. 
The nature of combat is such that seemingly trivial 
events can eventually have a large impact on battle 
outcomes. Compounding these events leads to a 
cascading effect that may, in turn, become a critical 
event. The nature of current audit trail analysis makes it 
nearly impossible to answer the question of why various 
events took place; this process will confii only that 
they did take place. In the context of the supply depot 
example, the analyst can discover that an air defense 
unit was not located close enough to the supply depot 
The question of u&y the unit was not close enough to 
provide sufficient defense still remains. 
ln order to standardize the process of tracing a 
critical event’s audit trail, one must have a consistent 
methodology that is applicable for any type of critical 
event. One method that will achieve these goals is a 
check.list of all reasonable scenario parameters that 
could affect an event. One should be able to reconstruct 
the ground, air and/or naval situation at any historical 
time during a training event. By using the following 
checklist of general questions in the same manner for 
every possible critical event, the causal relationships 
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gradually may become more evident, allowing for 
further analysis. 
Time and location: When did the critical event 
occur, and what were the locations of all involved 
units and/or targets? 
Force strength: What are the force strengths of 
the participating tits in the critical event? Are 
any reasonably too low? Do any of the partici- 
pating units have key combat systems casualties? 
Environmental conditions: Did weather, visibility 
conditions, or terrain hamper or overly assist any 
par&ipipy units in accomplishing their given 
Command and control issues: Were units on both 
sides able to communicate? Were any partici- 
pating units given multiple tasking or possibly 
wnfusing orders? 
Logistics: Were there any supply shortfalls? Were 
they due to a lack of or a misallocation of assets? 
Intelligence: Were there any intelligence short- 
falls? Were they due to a lack of or a misallo- 
cation of assets? 
Subjective issues: Did this critical event happen 
due to unexplained miscalculations or an error in 
a commander’s judgment, or due to chance? 
Once these questions are posed and the relevant 
questions answered, the analyst can then, if necessary, 
move to the next step of generating a set of critical 
event specific queries. 
3 JTLS SCENARIO 
The Joint Theater Level Simulation is an interactive, 
multi-sided, joint (air, land, sea, and special operations) 
and combined (coalition warfare) constructive simu- 
lation model which is used as both a robust tool to 
analyze theater level operations plans and as a vehicle 
to support training exercises and seminar wargames. 
JTLS strives to model conflict at the operational level 
with tactical fidelity. Additionally, JTLS maintains 
documentation of how functional areas interact through- 
out the game. 
JTLS uses SlMSCRlPT to support the need for a 
discrete time simulation. The advantage of the discrete 
time simulation is the ability to model activities that 
have been identified as critical events. The key 
processes of theater level, air land battle are most easily 
visualized as a collection of discrete (key) events. These 
critical events may significantly change the state of the 
systems. 
Rolands and Associates Corporation, the developer 
ofJT.LS, has cxated several routine which continually 
update ASCII output files with critical data during the 
conduct of a JTLS exercise. These files have been 
developed in conjunction with the UJTL assessment 
effort and provide a variety of data describing 
engagement results, resupply, and a number of other 
characteristics. The JTLS JMET output files comprise 
the input to the database for subsequent data retrieval. 
JTLS version 2.1 employs the ORACLE FZelationaJ 
Database Management System @DBMS). 
The selected JTLS scenario is set in the Southwest 
Asia theater of operations. The conditions exhibited 
were of an enemy seixure of the strategic initiative, 
sticiently degrading the ability to build combat power 
quickly in theater. The scenario resulted in long 
distances being covered to bring forces in contact with 
the enemy, demonstrating the difficulty in generating 
combat power and establishing a temporal advantage. 
This scenario is a likely one for several reasons. These 
reasons could relate to the occupation of friendly assets 
in another region or the ability of an aggressor nation to 
recognize the need to seize the initiative in the overall 
strategic situation. 
The Iraqi forces in this scenario have attacked 
across the border to Hai%-al-Batin in north central 
Saudi Arabia and to the Kuwaiti border along the coast. 
The immediate objective was to seize the Trans-Arab 
pipeline and control the flow of oil in northern Saudi 
Arabia. 
The deployment sequence was formulated to allow 
for one brigade each from the 1Olst Airborne Division 
and 24th Mechanized Infantry Division to arrive 
without difficulty at a port city near the city of Dhahran. 
Because the database already contained United 
Kingdom forces in the region, they were used to support 
Saudi Arabian forces in the vicinity of King Khalid 
Military City (KKMC!). Finally, the Iraqi advance along 
the coast stopped short of crossing into Saudi Arabia, 
allowing the deployment of two Marine Expeditionary 
Units into the area of Al-Khafji. Under the conditions of 
Iraqi strategic initiative, forces attacked well in advance 
of any Allied presence in the region. Iraqi forces 
secured the operational initiative by conducting 
preemptive air strikes on deploying United States forces. 
Forces from the 2nd Brigade of the 24th Mechanized 
lufantry Division (2/24th Mech) were given the mission 
to move west and support the defense of KKMC. The 
Iraqi air and ground efforts were designed to impede 
that movement. 
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4 CAUSAL AUDlT TRAIL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Subjectivity in Analysis 
In theory, the causal audit trail process can trace the 
causal factors from any critical event down to the most 
minute detail of combat In reality, the process’ limiting 
factors are a lack of significant quantitative data and the 
subjective battlefield decision. The causal audit trail is 
graphically presented as a version of a “decision tree.” 
This tree attempts to delineate all the possible causes of 
a critical event. enabling the analyst to follow the path 
that pmvidcs the most likely cause, based on quanti- 
tative data. The branches of the tree end when the data 
requiredtodeterminethecauseafacourseofactionis 
unreasonably large, impossible to retrieve, or when the 
analyst is faced with finding the cause of a 
commander’s subjective decision. 
The concept of being faced with a “subjective dead 
end” while performing wargaming analysis is further 
documented by Coleman Research Corporation’s (1997) 
efforts to quantitatively evaluate the entire UJTL. CRC 
concluded that of the 5199 UJTL tasks and their 
subordinate elements, only 4571 were capable of being 
objectively quantifiie& 
The remaining subjective or uncertain tasks leave 
several different aspects of combat which still remain 
unmeasurable. When faced with judgments about these 
aspects of combat while doing a causal audit trail 
analysis, the only alternative is to end that portion of the 
causal audit trail “tree” at the given subjective point. 
Several critical events are analyzed in 
Dromerhauser and McAneny (1997). In order to 
demonstrate an appreciation of the methodology, the 
Madinah Division Withdrawal is presented in this 
paper. 
4.2 Critical Event: Madlnah Division Withdrawal 
The critical event involves the progress of the 
2/24th Mech toward the objective area. After making 
steady movement toward KKMC during the first day, 
they were impeded by a successful Iraqi air strike at 
0.625 days. Damage was simulated and the resulting 
time of repair induced further delays. The 2J24th Mech 
eventually reached KKMC and engaged the Madinah 
Division in battle, but the effects of this delay are not 
clear. Madinah Division began to withdraw liom 
contact at day 1.15 and endured a twelve hour conflict 
with the 2/24th Mech during their retreat. After this, 
Coalition forces lost contact with the Madinah, and the 
division was allowed to withdraw unimpeded. This 
sequence yields an obvious question to ask Why was 
the Madinah Division allowed to withdraw 
unimpeded? 
In Brown’s (1996) efforts to measure suuz&ul 
operational maneuver, he states that “some method of 
quantifying the first order effects of operational art must 
he determined.” He continues by suggesting that this 
representation must include more than simply using the 
sped of any given combat system, or aggregation of 
systems. Instead, it must be relational, taking into 
acmmt the opcmtional maneuver of both friendly and 
enemy forces, as well as the descriptive characteristics 
of the units over time. 
The need for a relational descriptive parameter led 
to Brown’s development of a measure of performance 
that is called the Fractional Closure Rate, or FCRz 
whcref = a specified friendly maneuver element or 
target 
e = a specified enemy maneuver element or 
target 
t = timeofcaptureofthedata. 
The numerator of the FCR is a representation of the 
closure distance between two forces in some time 
interval, &, or more simply the approach velocity of 
two forces. Dividing by the maximum of the current 
distant between forces creates a measure which has the 
flexibility -of demonstrating -negative change in relation 
to the closure. Withdrawing at a certain distance has a 
negative FCR of the same magnitude as an advance at 
the same distancei 
Brown further explains that “the Fractional Closure 
Rate is developed only as a measure of performance to 
be incorporated into a measure of effectiveness for 
maneuver. It does have some stand-alone use as a 
measure of effectiveness of the ability of a force to 
maintain a high operational tempo. This translates to a 
quantitative measure of initiative and agility, using 
depth of attack as the data element” 
Brown’s first application of the utility of the FCR to 
wargaming is an analysis of the critical event: Madinah 
Division Withdrawal. The progress of 2J24.s movement 
westwad toward KKMC is exhibited in Figure 1, with 
curve behavior pointing to causal events which impede 
or facilitate that progress. The trend line, shown in 
black, uses every three data points to calculate a moving 
average, which is a characteristic representation of the 
overall trends in initiative and momentum. 
A slow, but successful movement toward the 
objective area is demonst@ed by the gradual rise in 
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2/24 (M) versus Madinah 
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Figure 1. Effects of Interdiction on Closure 
FCR from first movement until the delay caused by the 
Iraqi air strike at time 0.625. Damage is simulated and 
the resulting time of repair induces further delays. This, 
in turn, produces a drop in momentum until the 
completion of the first day. Additionally, the initiation 
of the ground offensive by the Madinah Division creates 
movement away from the 204’s static location, further 
decreasing the closure. As the damage is repaired, the 
closure ratio begins to increase rapidly for approxi- 
mately 0.25 days, or six hours. During this time the 
2l24 is able to close on KKMC and the Madinah 
Division, and join the battle. The more pronounced 
spatial acceleration, or slope of the FCR, is the result of 
the relational movement of the two forces moving 
toward the same location at this point in the battle. 
Madinah’s movement was necessary to initiate ground 
combat with forces aheady at KKMC, thereby maintain- 
ing the operational initiative. 
As Madinah begins to withdraw from contact at 
time 1.15, the FCR initially drops off before stabilizing 
back to the gradual rise exhibited in the first few hours 
of the scenario. At this point in the battle Madinah 
begins to lose its momentum, and the unimpeded 2/24 
closes and joins battle at approximately time 1.5. For 
the next twelve hours, the Coalition force is able to 
create a favorable tempo, but has arrived well after the 
Iraqi force was able to withdraw. Though creating a 
favorable FCR from time 1.5 to 2.0, it is occurring at 
the expense of pursuing an enemy with whom they still 
have not gained contact. Finally, at the beginning of the 
second day, Madinah continues its withdrawal unin- 
hibited by Coalition efforts. The curve characteristics at 
this point are useful to a CINC in evaluating the 
exercise. The defeated Iraqi force is able to reduce the 
FCR. This translates to an inability to prevent a force 
from escaping the battle area. If this were intentional, 
then the curve is simply an affiiation that the plan 
was properly conducted. If not, this analysis portrays the 
inability of the 24ti Mcch to maintain the tempo and 
create a favorable FCR with respect to the Iraqi forces. 
The Madinah Division executes the withdrawal 
along with the Hammurabi Division. The movement is 
from the KKMC area of operations to support forces 
along the coast. Given the lateral movement of the Iraqi 
forces, a successful counterattack plan would have 
slowed the withdrawal. 
The Uecision tree” for the Madinah withdrawal is 
shown in Figure 2. To answer the aforementioned 
question of why the Madinah Division is allowed to 
withdraw unimpeded, the possible broad categories of 
causes must be delineated. Was it due to poor 
intelligence, 2/24’s lack of mobility, a supply shortfall, 
low force strength, prior tasking of 2J24, or was this 
sequence of events nothing more than a Coalition 
operational tactic? 
Did 2124 have any prior tasking that would 
somehow impede their pursuit of Madinah? In order 
to investigate this question, the 2/24’s mission and 
posture data during the period leading up to Madinah’s 
withdrawal must be analyzed. Every unit in JTLS has 
both a mission and a posture. The mission is generally 
the last thing the unit was ordered to do. The posture 
describes what the unit is actually doing. This 
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Causal Audit Trail: Madinah Withdrawal 
Figure 2: Event One Causal Audit Trail Decision Tree 
information is available in chronological order in 2/24’s 
Unit Change List (Table l), which shows that 2/24 is in 
a MOVING posture ti-om day 0.05526 to 0.6648, when 
it then shifts to a DEPEND posture, then back to 
MOVING at 1.0013. It then briefly shifts back to 
DEPEND at day 1.1169 until 1.5007. 






















These observations tell the analyst that, for some 
reason, 2,/24’s mission and posture shifted ftom 
DEPEND to MOVING almost immediately before 
Madinah began their withdrawal at day 1.0016. This 
means that 2j24 had the correct mission and posture to 
follow Madinah, eliminating this as a possible cause for 
the critical event. However, at day 1.1169,2/24 went to 
a DEPEND posture which stopped 2424 from pursuing 
Madinah. 
Was apowing Madinah to withdraw a product of 
poor Coalition intdligence? This branch of the 
decision tree would be essential in most scenarios, but 
due to the composition of coalition and opposing forces 
in this wargame, intelligence played an almost 
nonexistent role. No HUMINTOrELINTaSsetsW~ 
allocated to either side, and air reconnaissance assets 
were not available because the Coalition forces were not 
allotted any air assets. This artificiality was put in place 
strictly for the purpose of enhancing the quantity of 
ground combat available for analysis. Had Coalition air 
forces been used, the possibility of opposing ground 
forces being quickly eliminated seemed very likely. The 
only intelligence related indicators that are available for 
analysis are opposing and. coalition’s perceptions of 
each others strength and location. 
The 2/24 receives accurate updates of Madinah’s 
location whenever Madinah’s location changes and 2/B 
is within the range of its given sensors. These sensors 
may be radars, intelligence sources, or in this case, 
eyeballs. When not within sensor range of Madinah, 
2J24 perceives them to be at their last known location 
(Pigure 3). This figure shows the distance, in nautical 
miles. between Madinah’s actual location and where 
2/24 perceives Madinah to be. As could be expected, the 
graph fohows the timeline of the scenario: after making 
steady movement toward KKMC and staying close to 
Madinah during the first day, 2J24 was impeded by a 
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Figure 3. Difference Between Madinah’s Perceived and Actual Locations 
successful Iraqi air strike at 0.625 days. Damage was 
simulated and the resulting time of repair induced 
further delays. The 2,LMth hJech eventually reached 
KKMC and engaged the Madinah Division in battle, 
then Madinah began to withdraw from contact at day 
1.0016 and endured a twelve hour conflict with the 
2/24th Mech during their retreat After this, Coalition 
forces lost contact with the Madinah, and the division 
was allowed to withdraw unimpeded. 
Of all possible branches of the causal audit trail 
tree, this one offers the most plausible one. The reason 
2j24 did not follow Madinah in its withdrawal was 
almost certainly the fact that they did not know where 
Madinah was. Once Madinah exceeded the range of 
2/24’s sensors, there were no other Coalition forces 
close enough to fiid this elusive Iraqi unit. 
Similar analysis of the perception of force strength 
is shown in Figure 4. The Zna maintains an accurate 
picture of Madinah’s force strength until they begin 
their withdrawal at day 1.0016 where, due to the 
increased range, Z/24 slightly underestimates Madi- 
nah’s force strength. This can also be attributed to the 
lack of Coalition intelligence assets. The only Coalition 
asset available to assess the strength of h&dinah is 2/24, 
since it is the only unit within range to perform this 
task. 
Had the scenario included other intelligence related 
data, the following elements would be essential for 
analysis of the critical event: 
l Report all of the organic intelligence data 
regardiug Madiuah forwarded during the entire 
scenario, and compare with the actual times of 
events to determine the age of the information. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.. 
I 
:;! .I' ::I 
i 
I !a! i~!iri.mll~ 
i 
wll::t Wll ! I 
I' 
iJ!i!i~ 
. . -.. , . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . .f . . . ..! 
0.5 1 1.5 2 
5conerb limo 
Figure 4. MadimWs Perceived and Actual Strength vs. Time 
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l Report which Coalition air recce assets were 
available and their tasking during the period 
leading up to I&dir&s withdrawal. 
l Report all air re4xe intelligence data forwanled 
during the given period of inquiry, and compare 
with the actual times of events to determine how 
time late they are. 
l ReportallCoalitionELINTandHUMINI’assets 
available during the given period of inquiry and 
their tasking during the same period. 
l ReportallELINI’and HUMINTdatafonvarded 
during the given period of inquiry, and compare 
with the actual times of events to determine its 
relevance. 
Searching for the most likely cause of this critical 
event reveals that the ‘poor intelligence” branch of the 
causal audit trail tree is the likely cause. Ignoring any 
potential subjective decisions that may have affected 
this scenario, the Coalition forces most glaring 
Achilles’ heel was their inability to track the enemy. 
This can be attributed almost entirely to their complete 
lack of deployed intelligence assets. 
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